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APPEALS. PROCEDURE IN WEST VIRGINIA
J. TIMOTHY PHILIPPS
The VEPCO case cites in this article were taken from the
advance sheets of the Southeastern Reporter. The case does not
appear in the corresponding bound volume. Therefore, this page of
corrected cites should be detached and placed opposite page 1 of
Volume 76, Number 1, in order to facilitate effective use of Profes-
sor Philipps' article for research purposes.
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Id. at 850-51.
zId. at 852-53.
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VEPCO-THE NEED FOR A REVISED TAX
APPEALS PROCEDURE IN WEST VIRGINIA
J. TIMOTHY PHILIPPS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Taxpayer representatives say Chicken Little was right;' the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals says that circuit court
judges should not hear evidence in tax cases; 2 and the State Tax
Department says good tax collectors also make good tax judges.3
The common focus of these three seemingly disparate and perhaps
hyperbolic statements is the process in West Virginia for taxpayer
appeals from assessments by the taxing authority, a process so
tortuous in its history as to exasperate such an eminent scholar as
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis,4 and the defects of which have
recently been crystallized by the decision in Virginia Electric &
Power Co. v. Haden.' Although the deficiencies in the process had
been recognized before VEPCO ,6 that case brought them to a head,
and makes some modification in the process at either the legisla-
*Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; B.S., Wheeling
College, 1962; J.D., Georgetown University, 1965; LL.M., Harvard Law School,
1966.
John Frederick Rist m, third year law student, was my assistant in preparation
of this article and contributed substantially to its completion.
'Statement of Mr. Stephen D. Tanner, C.P.A. at Twenty-Fourth Annual West
Virginia Tax Institute, Sept. 13, 1973. The context of Mr. Tanner's remark was a
panel discussion concerning revised State business tax regulations.
2See Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Haden, 198 S.E.2d 130 (W. Va. 1973).
'Cf. the position taken by the Tax Department in Virginia Electric & Power
Co. v. Hayden.
'See Davis, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in West Virginia-A
Study in Separation of Powers, 44 W. VA. L.Q. 270 (1938). See also Note, Extent
of Judicial Review of Tax Determinations in West Virginia, 50 W. VA. L.Q. 75
(1946).
4198 S.E.2d 130 (W. Va. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as VEPCO].
6See Chambers & Southworth, West Virginia Tax Law-Hearing and Appeal
Procedures, 74 W. VA. L. REv. 135 (1972).
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
tive or administrative level essential if West Virginia taxpayers are
to be assured fair and impartial consideration of their tax appeals.
HI. THE BACKGROUND
The origin of the problem lies in article V, §1 of the West
Virginia constitution, which explicitly requires a separation of
powers in State government.' The West Virginia court has taken
this provison quite literally, and a series of cases in the property
tax area illustrates the difficulties this has caused insofar as tax
appeals are concerned."
The West Virginia Code provides for an appeal to the circuit
court from decisions of the county court concerning valuation when
the county court is acting as a board of equalization and review for
property tax purposes,' and in certain instances for a subsequent
appeal to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.' 0 Over the
years, the contention has been made that valuation of property is
not a judicial function and therefore the court, under the separa-
tion of powers provision, can have no authority to substitute its
judgment as to valuation for that of the county court." The West
Virginia court has taken inconsistent positions on this question. In
the earliest cases the Supreme Court of Appeals decided that the
action of a court in reviewing a valuation placed on property by
the taxing authority was non-judicial. Therefore, it held that it was
without jurisdiction to review a question of valuation.'2 Subse-
7W. VA. CONST. art. V, §1:
The legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate and
distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to
either of the others; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than
one of them at the same time, except that justices of the peace shall be
eligible to the legislature.
This discussion does not purport to be an exhaustive analysis of all the cases.
Its purpose is merely to exemplify some of the difficulties the West Virginia court
has had in applying article V, §1, especially in tax cases.
'W. VA. CODE §11-3-25 (1966). Disputes concerning property valuation are ini-
tially considered by the county court acting as a board of equalization and review.
W. VA. CODE §11-3-24 (1966).
"W. VA. CODE §11-3-25 (1966).
"See generally Davis, supra note 4.
12See, e.g., Pittsburgh, Cinc., & St. L. Ry. v. Board of Pub. Works, 28 W. Va.
264, 268 (1886) (act of valuation characterized as being "ministerial" in nature);
Mackin v. County Court, 38 W. Va. 338, 341; 18 S.E. 632, 633 (1893) (valuation
characterized as "legislative"). A logical incongruity of these cases is that, although
they denied jurisdiction in the supreme court to consider questions of valuation,
they upheld such jurisdiction in the circuit courts. In Mackin the court distin-
[Vol. 76
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quently, however, the court assumed jurisdiction to decide a ques-
tion of valuation without consideration of the separation of powers
issue," and continued to do so in several succeeding cases. 4 How-
ever, in one of these it did question the power of the Legislature to
"clothe this court with authority and duty of reviewing assess-
ments," and stated that "we have submitted to it because of long
practice."'"
guished the situation of the two courts by stating:
Now there is a difference between the Supreme Court of Appeals and
Circuit Courts in respect to their capacity to have conferred upon them
such jurisdiction. While as I have above sought to show, this Court could
not be given such jurisdiction, because its appellate functions are con-
fined to judicial matters, yet it is different with Circuit Courts, since
section 12, Art. VIII, of the constitution after conferring upon them cer-
tain supervisory, original and appellate jurisdiction adds the clause:
"They shall also have such other jurisdiction, whether supervisory, origi-
nal, appellate or concurrent, as is or may be prescribed by law." I think
this clause authorizes the legislature to confer upon the Circuit Court the
right to entertain this appeal. The presence of this very important court
among the people in every county; its readiness, facility and competency
in the hearing and trial of matters by witnesses, juries and other-
wise;-the obvious necessity of a power in the legislature to render avail-
able and useful its functions in the administration of government by
charging it with jurisdiction of additional matters, as time and expe-
diency may suggest;-the whole cast, structure, and purpose of this
court, as seen in the constitution-tell us that we ought not to give a
narrow construction to this clause. To do so would defeat the purpose of
the convention, which framed the constitution, and cramp the usefulness
of the Circuit Courts. Besides this, there is the plain act of the legislature
giving the appeal to the Circuit Court.
Id. at 348-49, 18 S.E. at 635-36.
But if circuit courts are part of the judiciary, why should not the same separation
of powers principles apply to them as to the supreme court? See also Norfolk & W.
Ry. v. Board of Pub. Works, 124 W. Va. 562, 568-69, 21 S.E.2d 143, 146 (1942),
making a similar distinction between the circuit courts and the supreme court.
By contrast, in Wheeling Bridge & Term. Ry. v. Paull, 39 W. Va. 142, 147, 19
S.E. 551, 552 (1894) the supreme court, ordering a circuit court to consider a ques-
tion of valuation, flatly declared, "The ascertainment of the values of property is
strictly judicial . . . ." This statement was expressly disavowed by the court in
Norfolk & W. Ry., supra.
'
3Liberty Coal Co. v.Bassett, 108 W. Va. 293, 150 S.E. 745 (1929).
"See Crouch v. County Court, 116 W. Va. 476, 181 S.E. 819 (1935); West Penn
Power Co. v. Board of Review and Equalization, 112 W. Va. 442, 164 S.E. 862
(1932); Cochran Coal & Coke Co. v. Board of Equalization and Review, 110 W. Va.
556, 158 S.E. 906 (1931); Central Realty Co. v. Board of Review, 110 W. Va. 437,
158 S.E. 537 (1931).
" West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review and Equalization, 112 W. Va. 442,
446, 164 S.E. 862, 863 (1932). The "long practice" had apparently been followed
only since 1929. See Davis, supra note 4, at 277.
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol76/iss1/3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Later cases considered the separation of powers question more
closely, and, although acknowledging that the Supreme Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction to consider questions of valuation, set
strict standards for review of circuit court decisions on valuation."
The present status of the law appears to be that the Supreme
Court of Appeals will consider the question of valuation but will
not overturn a decision of the circuit court unless it is "either not
supported by substantial evidence, or is so palpably wrong as to
amount to a mala fides purpose to disregard the constitutional
principles of uniformity of taxation ....
Obviously, the court has found the problem a vexing one, as
well it might, since any attempt to classify the exercise of govern-
mental powers into neat categories must necessarily degenerate
into a futile exercise in semantics. Reality does not admit of such
precise classification. 8
"See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Board of Pub. Works, 124 W. Va. 562, 568, 21
S.E.2d 143, 146 (1942):
For the purpose of taxation, it [valuation] is primarily an executive or
administrative function with which the courts will not interfere unless
shown plainly to have been abused. [citation omitted] This Court...
can only view the matter of valuation for the purposes of taxation to the
extent that that may be done in the exercise of its judicial power.
The court stated it would not overturn a valuation unless it is plainly shown that
evidence has "been arbitrarily and unjustifiably ignored. . . ." Id. at 567, 21
S.E.2d at 146. Moreover, the taxpayer must show that he has suffered "material
prejudice." Id. at 570, 21 S.E.2d at 148.
In Western Md. Ry. v. Board of Pub. Works, 141 W. Va. 413, 423, 90 S.E.2d
438, 445 (1955), the court declared that a reviewing court would not "interfere with
the conclusions reached by an assessing body, unless the assessment made is clearly
illegal or grossly and palpably wrong on the facts." See also Bankers Pocahontas
Coal Co. v. County Court, 135 W. Va. 174, 62 S.E.2d 801 (1950); Western Md. Ry.
Co. v. Board of Pub. Works, 124 W. Va. 539, 21 S.E.2d 683 (1942).
"In re Southern Land Co., 143 W. Va. 152, 162, 100 S.E.2d 555, 560-61 (1957).
Subsequently, in the same opinion the court declared:
The ascertainment of the value of property for purposes of taxation is
primarily an executive or administrative function, with which the courts
will not and cannot interfere, unless the assessment upon which the pro-
posed taxation is based is without substantial evidence to support it, or
is in violation of the due process clause of the West Virginia Constitution,
Article I1, Section 10, or in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In all
other cases where taxation is not unlawfully made in contravention of a
statute or provision of the United States or West Virginia Constitutions,
this Court is without jurisdiction.
Id. at 163, 100 S.E.2d at 561.
"The term "reality" here is used in the sense of that which is discovered by
the mind, not made up by it.
[Vol. 76
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III. THE VEPCO CASE
It was in this context of confusion over proper application of
the separation of powers requirement to tax appeal procedures that
VEPCO acquired its significance. The taxpayer was a public util-
ity supplying power to various states including West Virginia. It
had a generating station located in West Virginia from which it
transmitted electricity to customers in Virginia, North Carolina,
and West Virginia.'9 The Tax Commissioner had assessed addi-
tional business and occupation tax, contending, inter alia,0 that
the taxpayer was liable under the manufacturing category on the
electricity it produced for out-of-state consumption.2' The measure
of the tax in this situation is the value in West Virginia of the
product manufactured. 22 Accordingly, it was necessary to place a
value on the electricity in question. The taxpayer had petitioned
for reassessment of the tax, and the Commissioner had denied the
petition?2 In making his decision on this petition, the Commis-
sioner had relied solely upon evidence from his auditor to deter-
mine the valuation question.
The taxpayer, on its appeal to the circuit court,24 contended
that this procedure denied it due process, whereupon the Commis-
sioner moved to remand the case to himself for a fuller hearing on
the valuation issue. Taxpayer then moved to strike the Commis-
sioner's motion to remand.? The circuit court denied the Com-
missioner's motion and found for the taxpayer on the substantive
issues. The Commissioner than appealed to the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals. 26
,198 S.E.2d at 132.
"Several substantive issues were involved in VEPCO, but for purposes of this
discussion only the tax appeals procedure will be considered.
21See W. VA. CODE ANN. §11-13-2b (1966). The years in question were 1962-66.
The case presented questions of both constitutional law and statutory interpreta-
tion. The statute was amended in 1971, making it clear that the Legislature in-
tended to impose a tax in such situations. See W. VA. CODE ANN. §11-13-2b (1973
Cum. Supp.).
21N. VA. CODE ANN. §§11-13-2, -2b (1973 Cum. Supp.).
nSee W. VA. CODE ANN. §11-13-7b (1966). For discussion of this procedure see
Part IV infra.
"See W. VA. CODE ANN. §11-13-8 (1966). For discussion of this procedure see
Part IV infra.
2198 S.E.2d at 133. The reasons for this maneuver are not entirely clear. Per-
haps the taxpayer reasoned that its due process argument would carry the day if
the case remained in its present posture, with no additional evidence on valuation
being heard; and in the event that additional evidence was heard it may have
preferred to present it to the circuit court rather than the Commissioner.
2"id. at 131-32.
6
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On the procedural issue the West Virginia court held that the
circuit court in the exercise of its "inherent powers" should have
remanded the case to the Tax Commissioner for further proceed-
ings to determine valuation.Y In so doing, the court construed the
statutory provision authorizing appeals to the circuit court,
providing that the circuit court "shall hear the appeal and deter-
mine anew all questions submitted to it on appeal from the deter-
mination of the tax commissioner."2 Relying on Walter Butler
Building Co. v. Soto,29 it declared that "the primary purpose of the
Legislature in enacting such provision was to permit judicial re-
view and determination of the validity of the tax commissioner's
ruling ... ."30 It went on to say this meant the court could con-
sider only "judicial questions,"'3' and then held that, as a conse-
quence, the circuit court could not take evidence in appeals from
decisions of the Tax Commissioner. In such cases, the circuit court
is limited to reviewing the record of the hearing before the Tax
Commissioner. The separation of powers requirement would pro-
hibit any other procedure in the circuit court, even if sanctioned
by the Legislature.32 The proper procedure here, therefore, was to
remand the case to the Commissioner to take further evidence on
the valuation question. Any subsequent appeal to the circuit court
would be a review on the record only.
"Id. at 134-35.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. §11-13-8 (1966).
2142 W. Va. 616, 97 S.E.2d 275 (1957). In this case, the court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute.
-198 S.E.2d at 134.
"Id. at 133.
"Id. at 135:
We deduce from the above-quoted language and from the cited authori-
ties that a hearing and determination anew, as provided in said Section
8, means that the circuit court shall make a judicial determination of the
correctness of the administrative decision, but that it does not permit
such court to receive new evidence in making a determination of the
issue. To allow the circuit court to determine an issue on evidence not
considered at the administrative hearing would cast the court in the role
of performing an executive function. Under the acknowledged principle
of separation of powers this cannot be permitted. Thus, the circuit court
must decide the case on the evidence in the record as it was received or
it must return the case to the Tax Commissioner for the further presenta-
tion of evidence on values.
The court cited three other cases as authority: Sims v. Fisher, 125 W. Va. 512, 25
S.E.2d 216 (1943); Danielly v. City of Princeton, i13 W. Va. 252, 167 S.E. 620
(1933); Hodges v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 110 W. Va. 649, 159 S.E. 834 (1931). None
of these was a tax case.
[Vol. 76
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IV. CONSEQUENCES OF VEPCO
The VEPCO decision was not totally unexpected, and its pos-
sible consequences had been anticipated. 33 In West Virginia there
is no generalized procedure, applicable to all taxes, for appealing
assessments by the Tax Commissioner.3 4 Each separate tax statute
contains whatever appeal procedure is applicable to it.35 However,
several of the taxes take the procedure set out in the business and
occupation tax as their model .3 For this reason, and also because
most of the reported cases have arisen under that tax, this discus-
sion, will for the most part, be confined to the business and occupa-
tion tax.
The procedure currently in effect requires the Commissioner
to give the taxpayer written notice of any assessment made pur-
suant to statutory power given him to assess additional taxes when
he determines an insufficient amount has been returned or paid.3 1
The statute does not, however, specify what this notice shall con-
tain. As a result, the Commissioner can comply with the statute
by supplying the skimpiest of notices.
The taxpayer then has thirty days in which to petition for
reassessment. The statute requires that the petition contain cer-
tain specified information concerning the reasons for the tax-
payer's protest. It then provides for an "informal" hearing "con-
ducted by an examiner designated by the tax commissioner. 38
Evidence may be taken at this hearing and briefs may be presented
subsequent to the hearing." The taxpayer may appear pro se or be
represented by another. 0 Proceedings at the hearing are recorded
by machines, but are not normally transcribed unless an appeal is
taken.4' The statute requires the Commissioner to give notice in
3See Chambers & Southworth, supra note 6.
3
'However, there is a generalized procedure for securing refunds. W. VA. CODE
ANN. §11-1-2a (1973 Cum. Supp.).
'E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. §11-13-7b to -8a (1966) (business and occupation tax).
"'E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. §11-15-24a to -24c (1966) (sales tax).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. §§11-13-7; 11-13-7b (1966).
-W. VA. CODE ANN. §11-13-7b (1966). The Tax Department currently employs
a full-time hearing examiner who conducts most of the hearings. Chambers &
Southworth, supra note 6, at 138 n.11.
"Proposed W. Va. Bus. & Occup. Tax Reg. §2.3 (1974).
"'Id. The Tax Department does not require that the taxpayer's representative
be an attorney. There is some question, however, whether such an appearance by
a non-attorney would constitute unauthorized practice of law, particularly in light
of VEPCO. See Chambers & Southworth, supra note 6, at 144-45.
flChambers & Southworth, supra note 6, at 138-39.
8
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writing of his decision on the petition within a reasonable time.
This notice has recently been expanded by the Commissioner to
include findings of fact and conclusions of law."
If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the decision of the Commis-
sioner he can appeal to the circuit court.13 Prior to VEPCO there
had been some question concerning the scope of review in the
circuit court. As previously noted, the statute provides that the
"court shall hear the appeal and determine anew all questions
submitted to it on appeal . . . . "I The plain meaning of this lan-
guage would seem to require a trial de novo, and this was appar-
ently the construction given it until fairly recently. 5 However, a
short while ago, the Kanawha County Circuit Court began to take
the position that it was limited to review of the record made at the
Tax Commissioner's hearing and could not grant a de novo trial."
This position was severely crticized by some commentators and
members of the tax bar, 7 but was ultimately accepted by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in VEPCO.
What is the taxpayer's situation following VEPCO? The opin-
ion clearly stated that the appeal to the circuit court should be
heard solely on the record and that the court cannot hear new
evidence. The opinion did not discuss explicitly the standard of
review, but a usual corollary of review on the record is that the
reviewing court will not overturn the decision of a lower tribunal
unless such decision is clearly erroneous or is not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 8 If this standrard
is applied, the hearing by the Tax Commissioner, in effect, takes
the place of a lower court trial.
The deficiencies in this procedure are obvious. The hearing is
conducted and the decision is made by employees of the Tax De-
partment. The Tax Commissioner or his delegates act both as
111d. at 138.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. §11-13-8 (1966):
An appeal may be taken by the taxpayer to the circuit court of the county
in which the activity taxed was engaged, or in which the taxpayer resides,
or in the circuit court of Kanawha county, within thirty days after he
shall have received notice from the tax commissioner of his determina-
tion ....
,,1d.
"Chambers & Southworth, supra note 6, at 138-41.
,
61d.
47See, e.g., id. at 141-49.
"NSee K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATrvE LAW TREATISE §29.01 (1957).
[Vol. 76
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prosecutor and judge. No matter how objective they may attempt
to be, it is difficult to see how employees of the Tax Department
can afford a taxpayer the independent, impartial hearing that
minimal fairness requires." The natural identification of an em-
ployee is with the institution employing him. Such identification
may not necessarily or even likely be conscious. Nevertheless, it
seems almost certain to exist. Furthermore, even if Tax Depart-
ment employees were able to perform the mental gymnastics nec-
essary to afford impartial hearings, the difficulties involved in such
a process would be so manifest that taxpayer morale would very
likely suffer.5'
Stated simply, a process in which the functions of revenue
collector, prosecutor, and judge reside in the same office is grossly
deficient both from the standpoint of fairness and also its capacity
to convey to the public an image of justice. 2 An office whose func-
tions conflict so patently cannot, even with the purest of inten-
tions, convey the image of fairness and impartiality which an ade-
quate appeal process requires.
The situation, as a result of VEPCO, is one in which the tax-
payer's only opportunity for a full hearing is before an office whose
interests inherently conflict with the function of deciding his case
impartially. Before the courts he is limited to a hearing on the
record made before the Tax Commissioner, with the court presum-
ably applying the exacting traditional standard of upholding the
administrative decision unless it is clearly erroneous or not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. The Tax Commissioner has, in
effect, become the tax judge as well as the tax collector. Clearly,
as the situation stands, West Virginia taxpayers are left with an
inadequate appeal process.
"The same criticism can be made of the county court's reviewing property tax
assessments. See Hellerstein, Judicial Review of Property Tax Assessments, 14 TAX
L. REv. 327 (1959). The county court is interested in raising revenue, but is also
expected to decide taxpayer protests impartially.
50See Kray, California Tax Court: An Approach to Progessive Tax
Administration, 37 S. CAL. L. REv. 485, 488 (1964).
"'In the words of Dean Roscoe Pound: "[Tihat the public believe justice is
done is no less important than that it be done with the greatest possible precision."
Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 696, 701-02 (1913).
52The concept of separation of functions is embodied in theFederal Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §554(d)(2) (1970), which provides that an agency
employee who presides at reception of evidence in an administrative adjudication
shall not "be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee
or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for
an agency."
10
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V. SEPARATION OF THE TAX COLLECTION AND TAx ADJUDICATION
FUNCTIONS
A. Constitutional, Legislative, and Administrative Alternatives
Clearly the functions of tax collection and tax adjudication
ought to be separated. The scope of judicial review prescribed by
VEPCO would be adequate, provided the taxpayer was afforded
the opportunity for an independent and impartial hearing at some
earlier stage . 3 There seem to be three possible alternatives for
achieving this.
From a theoretical standpoint, the ideal proposal would be
establishment of an independent tax court to be part of the judicial
branch. This is the course followed by Oregon,5 a state whose
demographic characteristics are not greatly dissimilar from West
Virginia.- However, this probably could not be done without a
constitutional amendment, since the West Virginia constitution
does not specifically authorize a tax court as part of the judiciary."
Furthermore, in the absence of a constitutional amendment, a
judicial tax court would presumably be subject to the same separa-
tion of powers limitations on judicial review as are placed on the
circuit courts by VEPCO.
'1See Hellerstein, supra note 49, at 349:
The nature and scope of judicial review, it is submitted, must depend on
the character of the review provided in the administrative process. If the
taxpayer is given a fair hearing to review the action of the assessor before
a competent, impartial, and independent review board, where he is given
adequate opportunity to present his evidence and make his arguments,
then it is hard to see why the courts should do more than consider what
are typically regarded as problems of law, errors of method, and impro-
priety in procedure. On the other hand, if the review offered in the admin-
istrative proceeding is a perfunctory, rubber-stamp type of hearing, con-
ducted by the taxing agency itself, or by other departments or persons in
the executive branch of government with responsibilities for budgets or
tax collections, or other persons who because of the nature of their duties
are likely to tend to favor the administration, then there is considerable
justification for a broad scope of judicial review.
-ORE. REv. STAT. §§305.405-.555 (1971). This is also the approach taken by the
Model State Tax Court Act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. The Model Act is published in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 234-39 (1957).
55See generally, TAx FOUNDATION OF AMERICA, FACTS AND FIGURES ON GOVERN-
MENT FINANCE 131-62 (1973).
"See W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, §1:
"The judicial power of the State shall be vested in a supreme court of appeals,
in circuit courts and the judges thereof, in such inferior tribunals as are herein
authorized and in justices of the peace." (emphasis added).
[Vol. 76
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An alternative to a judicial tax court would be establishment
by the Legislature of an independent administrative board of tax
appeals. This could presumably be accomplished constitutionally,
since the board of tax appeals would basically take over the adjudi-
ciation functions now performed by the Tax Commissioner, and it
has not been suggested that performance of these functions by an
administrative body would suffer any constitutional infirmities
from a separation of powers standpoint.
A third and less desirable course, but one which would proba-
bly not require legislation, would be for the Tax Commissioner to
establish within the Tax Department an independent adjudication
office to which authority to decide appeals would be delegated.17
The mechanics of creating such an office would admittedly be
difficult, since the adjudication office would still be part of the Tax
Department, and therefore not totally independent. However, such
an office would certainly be an improvement over the present situ-
ation," and the mechanics of providing at least a measure of inde-
pendence should not be insurmountable."
B. Characteristics of an Independent Tax Adjudicatory Body
Regardless of which of these alternatives might be chosen,
certain characteristics should be present in any system entrusted
with the adjudication of taxpayer appeals. Since an independent
administrative board of tax appeals appears most feasible consti-
tutionally and practically, the necessary characteristics of such a
board will be examined. 0
First, the board of tax appeals should have jurisdiction over
"'How far the Commissioner could go in so delegating his decision-making
authority raises additional questions. It would not seem to be in the interest of
taxpayers to challenge such a delegation, however, and it is highly unlikely that the
Commissioner would challenge his own delegation.
"The present system of employing a full-time hearing examiner does not stand
up to scrutiny on the question of independence and impartiality. The hearing
examiner lacks true independence and other Tax Department employees are also
involved in the decision-making process.
"One model might lie in the appointment of an officer similar to the indepen-
dent judicial officers utilized by some federal agencies. See, e.g., 39 U.S.C. §204
(1970) (Judicial Officer to adjudicate disputes with the United States Postal Serv-
ice).
.What is said here about an administrative board of tax appeals would also
apply in the main to a judicial tax court or an independent tax adjudication office
established by the Tax Commissioner.
12
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all state and local taxes, including property taxes." This would
permit a uniform statewide system of appeals for all taxes. Hear-
ings before the Tax Commissioner, or in the case of property taxes
before the county court, should be retained as informal adminis-
trative proceedings. However, appeals to the board of tax appeals
from determinations in such proceedings should be held de novo."2
There would thus be opportunity for an independent, impartial
hearing at which all evidence could be presented. In addition,
provision should be made to insure that the taxpayer is fully and
adequately informed of the reasons for the additional assessment
against him. This would not necessarily mean that the Tax Com-
missioner would be required to give away his case prior to appeal,
but a minimum of disclosure insuring that the taxpayer knows why
he is being assessed additional taxes should be mandatory.
There should also be a requirement for the board to make
written findings of fact and conclusions of law, 3 and to publish
decisions of precedential value. 4 The latter requirement would aid
the tax bar by facilitating development of a body of case law con-
siderably more complete than now seems possible. 5
The board of tax appeals should be established as an indepen-
dent entity within the executive branch with a permanent office
and adequate staff. It should be empowered to hold hearings
throughout the State." It should further have authority, within
"For the purposes of the property tax, questions of valuation are now decided
initially by the county court acting as a board of equalization and review, W. VA,
CODE ANN. §11-3-24 (1973 Cum. Supp.), and questions of classification and taxabil-
ity are decided by the Tax Commissioner, W. VA. CODE ANN. §11-3-24a (1966).
12See, e.g., MODEL STATE TAX COURT AcT §9 (1957): "All proceedings before the
court shall be de novo." Oregon has a similar provision. ORE. REv. STAT. §305.425
(1) (1971).
OSee, e.g., MODEL STATE TAX COURT AcT §14 (1957); ORE. REV. STAT. §305.435
(1971).
"See, e.g., MODEL STATE TAX COURT AcT §17:
"The court shall provide for the publication of its decisions which are of general
public interest in the form it deems best adapted for public convenience." Oregon's
provision is substantially identical. ORE. REv. STAT. §305.450(1).
"Currently, most of the law is found in the statutes themselves, in regulations
promulgated by the Tax Commissioner, and in cases decided by the Supreme Court
of Appeals. Some circuit court opinions are also available. A body of case law
developed by a board of tax appeals would contribute substantially to the available
materials, much as decisions of the United States Tax Court contribute to the
federal tax law.
"See, e.g., MODEL STATE TAX COURT ACT §5 (1957) ORE. REV. STAT. §§305.475,
.480 (1971).
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broad statutory guidelines, to promulgate its own rules of practice
and determine the manner in which it shall conduct hearings.67
One of the main advantages of a board of tax appeals is that
it would be a body specializing in tax matters. This would allow
the board to develop an expertise in tax matters which is now
difficult for any State court of general jurisdiction to acquire. Ac-
cordingly, qualifications for appointment to the board should be
set to assure attainment of this expertise.
One problem that might arise in this area is that the case load
of the board might not be sufficient to merit appointment of even
one full-time member." This would necessitate appointment of a
part-time board of one or more members. If a part-time board was
established, care would have to be taken to guard against potential
conflicts of interest in the members, who presumably would be tax
practitioners also. 9
Another question is the procedure for appeals from decisions
of the board. These, of course, would, under VEPCO, have to be
heard solely on the record. The best thinking seems to be that
appeals from such a board should be directed to the highest court
in the jurisdiction since appeal to an intermediate court would
probably provide too many layers of appeal. 0 However, there may
be constitutional problems with such a procedure in West Vir-
ginia. 7'
"'It has been suggested that such a board should follow the Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the United States Tax Court, since most tax practitioners are
familiar with these. On the other hand, in the case of West Virginia, it may be that
the State's own rules of practice and procedure would be more appropriate. The
Model Act leaves this question undecided. MODEL STATE TAX COURT ACT §9 (1957).
"Chambers & Southworth, supra note 6, at 149 n.46. Oregon's Tax Court has
one full-time member. See ORE. REV. STAT. §305.452 (1971).
" The conflict of interest problems inherent in a part-time board are obvious.
However, if the case load in West Virginia is in fact too light to merit a full-time
board, VEPCO still would seem to leave a part-time board as the only practical
alternative to the present unsatisfactory situation.
7 See MODEL STATE TAx COURT ACT §19 (1957); ORE. REV. STAT. §305.445
(1971); Kray, supra note 50, at 512.
7 See W. VA. CONsT. art. VIII, §3, conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court
of Appeals. The question is whether the court would be exercising either the "appel-
late" or "original" jurisdiction conferred by that section. The West Virginia court
now directly reviews decisions of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. W.
VA. CODE ANN. §23-5-4 (1973 Cum. Supp.). Therefore, perhaps a similar provision
for appeals from the board of tax appeals would be valid.
14
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C. Small Claims Procedure
Finally, Oregon's tax court statute has introduced a procedure
which would merit special consideration in the establishment of
any board of tax appeals in West Virginia. That is a provision for
a small claims division.7 2 The taxpayer who qualifies for the small
claims procedure may elect either it or the regular procedure. Once
this election is made, it is irrevocable.7 3 Judgments under the small
claims procedure are not appealable, and they are not considered
to be judicial precedents for any case. 74
The Oregon statute requires that when an additional assess-
ment or other determination or order of the Tax Department is
sent to the taxpayer, a notice of his right to appeal to the small
claims division be sent at the same time. 75 The taxpayer may then
fill out a simple form available from the county clerk and file it
with the court. This constitutes the commencement of his action.7"
A hearing is held at which the taxpayer may represent himself 7 or
be represented by another. Hearings are informal, and the judge
is granted broad discretion in the admission of evidence. 8 To qual-
ify for the small claims procedure the amount in controversy may
not exceed $250. 71 This amount is probably too low. It was placed
in the statute at its inception in 1962 and, apparently, has not been
changed since. A more reasonable figure would be $1,500. This is
the amount for the small claims procedure in the United States
Tax Court.80
"ORE. REv. STAT. §§305.515-.555 (1971). Another interesting feature of the
Oregon statute is that it provides for reimbursement to an individual taxpayer of
costs, attorney fees, and other expenses of litigation in income tax cases where the
taxpayer prevails. ORE. REv. STAT. §305.447 (1971).
"ORE. REv. STAT. §305.530 (1971).
"ORE. REV. STAT. §305.555 (1971).
"ORE. REv. STAT. §305.525 (1971).
"ORE. REv. STAT. §305.535 (1971); Kray, supra note 50, at 516.
"If the taxpayer represents himself, an orientation is provided to assist him in
presenting his case. Kray, supra note 50, at 516.
"OaE. Rav. STAT. §305.545 (1971):
"The hearing in the small claims division shall be informal, and the judge may
hear such testimony and receive such evidence as he deems necessary or desirable
for a just and equitable determination of the case . .. ."
71O. Rsv. STAT. §305.515(3) (a) (1971). In cases involving determination of the
value of property, the value as determined by the collecting agency cannot exceed
$25,000 in the case of real property or $10,000 in the case of personal property,
'0INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7463. This amount was raised from $10000 by Pub.
L. No. 92-512, §203(b) (Oct. 20, 1972), effective Jan. 1, 1974.
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A small claims procedure would be necessary for any board of
tax appeals if all taxpayers are to receive fair consideration of their
tax disputes. Equity demands that all taxpayers, not only those
whose tax liabilities make it worthwhile to retain attorneys and
engage in protracted litigation, should have their tax disputes
heard by an independent, impartial tribunal. Given the expense
involved in contesting tax claims under regular procedures, it sim-
ply is not worthwhile for many taxpayers to express what may be
valid objections to tax assessments. A small claims procedure
would go far to ameliorate this problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
VEPCO has crystallized the problems involved with the pres-
ently existing tax appeal procedures in West Virginia. The ruling
in that case makes it plain that short of an amendment to article
V, § 1 of the West Virginia constitution, the only way taxpayers
will be able to obtain truly impartial determinations of their tax
disputes is by establishment of an independent tax court or board
of tax appeals, which includes a small claims division. Working
models exist for such an entity. The idea has been successful else-
where. There is no substantial reason why it cannot work in West
Virginia.
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